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M
any European corporations feature a dominant
shareholder with a degree of control over man-
agement well in excess of his cash-flow rights. The
principal issue raised by such a regime is not the tradi-
tional agency conflict between entrenched managers
and dispersed shareholders studied by academics for
decades, but rather the conflict between controlling
shareholder and outside shareholders. The conflict
arises because the controlling shareholder enjoys pri-
vate benefits of control that are unavailable to outside
shareholders.The consumption of private benefits is of
concern to outsiders if it reduces the value of their
equity stake in the firm, as when it entails the misap-
propriation of corporate resources or when it leads the
firm to pursue inefficient operating and investment
policies.When that occurs, the market value of shares
held by outside investors is adversely affected.
We use a sample of European corporations to inves-
tigate empirically how the consumption of private
benefits of control by the firm’s largest shareholder
impacts on corporate valuation. We posit that the
market value of a company’s shares ought to reflect
at least two effects: the incentive held by the firm’s
dominant shareholder to consume private benefits at
the expense of his fellow shareholders – i.e.,an incen-
tive effect – and his ability to do so – an entrench-
ment effect. The empirical estimation of these two
effects, however, raises a number of econometric
challenges. First, one needs to find a variable that
measures accurately the degree of entrenchment of
the firm’s dominant shareholder. Second, since the
incentive effect ought to be active only for firms with
entrenched owners,some criteria has to be employed
to identify which firms meet such requirement.
We propose a methodological approach that deals
with these two econometric issues. Regarding our
choice of proxy for the entrenchment effect,we work
with the Shapley Value (SV) of the proportion of
votes controlled by the dominant shareholder rather
than the proportion of votes itself,as is typical in the
literature.Such measure takes into consideration the
non-linear relationship that exists between the real
power wielded by the dominant shareholder and his
control over voting rights, and accounts for the dis-
tribution of votes across remaining shareholders as
well. For illustration, consider the following two
firms. Firm A has two large shareholders – one with
40 percent and another with 35 percent of votes –
and many small shareholders holding 1 percent of
votes each. Firm B has only one large shareholder
with 30 percent of votes and many small sharehold-
ers with 1 percent of votes each. A power measure
based on the proportion of votes alone would lead us
to conclude that the main shareholder of firm A is
more powerful than that of firm B.That is, however,
an erroneous conclusion since the large stake held
by the second-largest shareholder of firm A con-
tributes to keep in check the power of the main
shareholder (the SV of the main shareholder of firm
A is equal to 0.365 whereas that of firm B is 0.423).
The SV is also a better measure of control because it
recognizes that any voting stake greater than 50 per-
cent confers absolute control,so assigning it a power
index equal to one.
Furthermore, we devise an estimation procedure
that gets around the need of using an arbitrary rule
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indicating which firms in the sample have
entrenched owners and which don’t. We hypothe-
size that the main shareholder of a firm becomes
entrenched when the SV of his vote stake crosses
an unobservable threshold.The threshold is jointly
estimated with the other parameters of the model
using every firm in the sample, including those
whose main shareholder holds a low percentage of
voting rights.
We illustrate the application of the approach on a
sample of European firms. For this sample the esti-
mated threshold in the SV of the voting rights of
the main shareholder is equal to 0.34. At the esti-
mated threshold the relationship between the firm
value and the proportion of cash flow rights not
held by the main shareholder (CFR) undergoes a
structural shift, giving rise to two distinct regimes.
In the high-SV regime we document a negative
effect of the CFR variable on firm value, that is
both statistically and economically significant;
in the low-SV regime we find no evidence of
such an effect. The large majority of sample firms
from the UK have a main shareholder with a SV
below the estimated threshold. In contrast, about
half of continental firms feature a main share-
holder whose power index is above the estimated
threshold.
An econometric model of expropriation activities
by controlling shareholders
Our main hypothesis is that the occurrence of
expropriating activities by the main shareholder
depends critically on whether he or she has enough
power, within the set of all shareholders, to dictate
his or her own objectives to the management of the
firm.Where that happens – the entrenchment effect
is said to be “switched on”– expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders occurs and is negatively related to
the ownership of cash-flow rights of the main share-
holder (i.e., the incentive effect). In contrast, where
the main shareholder enjoys only a modest level of
power – i.e., the entrenchment effect is said to be
“switched off” – his grip on control is either too
weak or non-existent and thus his incentive to
expropriate is irrelevant. Our empirical model has
the reduced form:
where Vi is a metric for the market performance of
the shares of firm i, Xi1,..,XiK are control variables,
CFRi is the proportion of cash-flow rights not held
by the largest shareholder of firm i, SVi is the
Shapley Value of the main shareholder of firm i and
SV* is the (unknown) critical threshold in Shapley
Value that switches “on”and “off”the entrenchment
effect. Running the data on the reduced form model
yields estimates of the coefficients β0, β1,...,βK,a 0,b 0,
a1,b1 plus an estimate of the critical threshold SV*.
The key testable hypotheses are stated as SV*>0,
b1<0 and b0=0.
Under our approach the researcher doesn’t need to
make a judgment call, for each sample firm, regard-
ing whether its largest shareholder is or is not
entrenched. Extant studies restrict their samples to
firms for which it is reasonable to presume that their
main shareholders hold tight control over manage-
ment.That is achieved by a sampling procedure that
excludes firms featuring main shareholders whose
fraction of voting rights is below a given threshold.
Rather than relying on an arbitrary threshold, we
choose instead to use all available firms and estimate
the threshold jointly with the other parameters of
the model. Our underlying hypothesis is that the SV
of the voting rights held by the main shareholder is
the driving variable determining whether he has
enough power to run the company according to his
own interests. Hence our threshold is defined in
terms of the SV of the votes and not in terms of the
proportion of votes, as in previous studies. We thus
obtain a market-based estimate of the critical level
in SV at which the main shareholder becomes
entrenched. We also have a chance to empirically
evaluate the impact of the incentive effect above and
below the endogenously estimated SV threshold,
and verify whether the estimated impacts are in
accordance with the testable hypotheses of the
empirical model.
Sample selection and data
Sample selection
Our point of departure was the population of firms
comprising the pan-European market index FTSE
Eurotop 300 in December 1999. We removed from
the sample financial corporations (i.e., firms with
SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and corporations
for which we could not get information either about
the cash-flow rights, the voting rights of the largest
  Vi = 0+1Xi1+...+KXiK + [a0+b0*CFRi] if SVi<SV
*
  Vi = 0+1Xi1+...+KXiK + [a1+b1*CFRi] if SVi>SV
* shareholder or, yet, the distribution of vote stakes
across shareholders with at least 5 percent of votes.
The final sample comprised 204 firms.
Fig.1 shows the distribution of sample firms by coun-
try.More than one-third of the sample are UK firms,
evidencing the prominent role played by the UK in
European stock markets.
The industries represented in the sample are fairly
balanced, although there is a slight dominance of
firms affiliated with telecommunication and chemi-
cal&allied products. Fig. 2 shows a detailed break
down of sample firms by industry.
The proxy for firm value
Extant research evaluating the influence of owner-
ship and control variables on corporate valuation
has used the market-to-book (MTB) ratio of assets
as the primary measure of firm value. Likewise, we
use the market-to-book value of assets as our proxy
for firm value.The book value of assets and the book
value of equity are obtained from annual reports
whereas the market value of equity is computed, for
each sample firm, by multiplying the number of out-
standing shares by the share price prevailing at the
close of its fiscal year.
Proxies for ownership and control
The power of any given player in a voting game
depends on his probability of becoming pivotal in a
winning coalition. Consider a corporation with
majority voting and n shareholders, each holding his
own voting stake. If we order
shareholders randomly, each
particular sequence of share-
holders has a probability of
occurrence equal to 1/n!. For
each sequence, the pivot is the
shareholder whose votes, once
added to the votes already held
by all the shareholders preced-
ing him, yield the first coalition
to cross the 50 percent vote
threshold (simple majority
game). The SV of shareholder i
is the number of sequences in
which shareholder i is a pivot
(Pi) divided by the number of all
possible sequences.
Annual reports were the primary source of informa-
tion for ownership data. Most European countries
require listed corporations to disclose all equity
stakes exceeding 5 percent. For most firms in the
sample therefore, annual reports allow us to identify
all stakes greater than 5 percent. In computing vote
stakes we considered the effects of equity structures
featuring multiple classes of shares with differential
voting rights.We also took into account the informa-
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tion disclosed in annual reports regarding mecha-
nisms of separation of ownership and control such as
voting caps, programs assigning additional votes for
shares held for more than a certain period of time
and golden shares held by entities such governments
and state-controlled companies. With respect to
unidentified shareholders – i.e., shareholders with
vote stakes below the 5 percent reporting threshold
– we assumed them to be atomistic.
The median SV in the sample of 204 firms is 0.146
but the distribution is markedly bimodal: there is a
large number of SVs equal to 1 and there is a large
number of SVs clustered below 0.15 too. For 16 per-
cent of sample firms the main shareholder enjoys
complete control; conversely, for 38 percent of firms
the main shareholder displays SVs of less than 0,1,
thus wielding little – if any – power over fellow
shareholders. The large proportion of firms with
weak main shareholders is explained by the weight
of British firms in the sample, which generally dis-
play a fragmented ownership structure.
We also assign countries to either a common law
group or a civil law group, according to their legal
origin.The common law group includes the UK and
Ireland; all other countries fall into the civil law
group. The median value for common law countries
is almost one order of magnitude lower than the cor-
responding value for civil law countries, evidencing
the wide gulf in ownership patterns separating UK
firms from continental firms.A test of medians con-
firms the casual observation that the two medians
are distinct from each other.
The remaining variable of interest in the empirical
model is the proportion of cash-flow rights not held
by the firm’s largest shareholder (CFRi).To compute
this variable we identify the participation of the
largest shareholder in all classes of equity securities
conferring cash-flow rights. For firms with a single
class of stock outstanding we assumed that the pro-
portion of cash-flow rights held by the main share-
holder is equal to the number of shares under his
ownership divided by the total number of outstand-
ing shares, unless stated otherwise in the annual
report. For corporations with multiple classes of
stock outstanding, we computed the cash-flow stake
of the main shareholder by adding up all his cash-
flow rights across all existing stock classes.The vari-
able CFRi is computed by subtracting the proportion
of cash-flow rights held by the main shareholder
from one.
The median value of the CFR variable in the sample
is 0,89, indicating a high level of ownership concen-
tration among European corporations. When we
look at the effect of country’s legal origin we find
that the median value of the variable for civil law
countries is significantly lower than the correspond-
ing value for common law countries.
Control Variables
To isolate the impact of ownership and control on
corporate performance one ought to control for
other potential effects. Our controls are: firm size
(i.e.,log of the book value of assets),leverage,indus-
try dummies to account for possible industry-specif-
ic differences in corporate valuations and a dummy
associated with a country’s legal origin (i.e.,common
law versus civil law) to control for the legal protec-
tion granted to minority shareholders.
The impact on firm value resulting from the separa-
tion of ownership and control by large shareholders
In addition to the coefficients associated with the
controls, the empirical model estimates five parame-
ters: the two linear coefficients associated with the
impact of the CFR variable on MTB ratios in the
low-SV regime;the two linear coefficients associated
with the impact of the CFR variable on MTB ratios
in the high-SV regime; and finally, the SV threshold
determining the regime switch.
The results of the estimation are reported in the
Table. The estimated SV threshold is equal to 0.34,
which splits the sample into 135 firms with SVs
below and 69 firms with SVs above the threshold.1
Additionally, the estimated CFR coefficient in the
high-SV regime is negative and statistically signifi-
cant,as predicted.The coefficient is also economical-
ly significant: a one standard deviation increase in
CFR produces a reduction of 1.34 in the MTB ratio,
a drop of about 45.6 percent relative to the sample’s
average MTB ratio. In contrast, the CFR coefficient
in the low-SV regime is statistically insignificant.
1 There are many distributions of voting rights that yield a Shapley
Value of 0.34. For example, the main shareholder will display a SV
of 0.34 if he controls 25 percent of votes and every other share-
holder is atomistic.
A SV of 0.34 will also be obtained if the main shareholder controls
26 percent of votes, a second shareholder controls 10 percent and
every other shareholder is atomistic. Yet another case of SV=0.34
occurs when the main shareholder controls 40 percent, a second
shareholder controls 36 percent and every other shareholder is
atomistic.The estimated threshold is an interesting piece of
evidence in itself because it is an estimate of what
market participants believe is the critical level of
power that gives the main shareholder entrenched
control over the firm’s management. With the
threshold at 0.34, there are 60 (48 percent) firms
from civil law countries above the threshold but only
9 (11 percent) from common law countries. The
entrenchment of dominant shareholders appears
thus to be much more pervasive in continental
Europe than in the UK.
The threshold model assumes an abrupt transition
between the two regimes governing the relationship
between the CFR variable and MTB ratios. We fur-
ther considered an extension of the empirical model
that allows for the speed of transition in entrench-
ment regime – i.e.,the transition from the “off”posi-
tion to the “on” position and vice-versa – to be esti-
mated from the data. The results for the extended
model show that the transition of regime is abrupt
and centered around point SV=0.35, which is very
close to the breakpoint estimated for the threshold
model (SV=0.34).
Conclusions
We have put forward a novel methodological
approach to estimate the effect of separation of own-
ership and control by dominant shareholders on firm
value.The approach uses the SV of the voting rights
of the dominant shareholder rather than the propor-
tion of votes under his control as a measure of his
power of control within the firm. We argue that the
main shareholder becomes entrenched when the SV
of his voting rights crosses an unknown threshold
that is estimated from the data jointly with the other
model parameters.
We apply this method to a sample of European firms
and estimate a threshold equal to 0.34. Most firms
from the UK have a main shareholder with a SV
below the estimated threshold; in contrast, about
half of the continental firms in the sample feature
main shareholders whose power index is above the
estimated threshold. We document a negative rela-
tionship between the incentive to expropriate and
corporate valuation above the threshold,that is both
statistically and economically significant; below the
threshold, we find no such relationship.
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Threshold Model with Shapley Value (SV)
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R
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Adj. R
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N = 204; (*) Significance level = 0.1; (**) Significance level = 0.05; (***) Significance level = 0.01 
MTBi = 0(industry dummies) +  D(Country legal Origin)i +  ln(Book Value of Assetsi) + a0 +(a1-a0)DSVi 
 + [b0(1- DSVi) + b1 DSVi] x CFRi  + wi 
where DSVi =1 if SVi > SV
* and zero otherwise, and D(Country legal Origin)i = 1 if legal originis common law and zero
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